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WRONGFUL PROCREATION, FACTORY FARMING,
AND THE AFTERLIFE
Dustin Crummett

Sometimes, I can affect whether an individual is created, but not how their
life goes if they’re created. If their life will be bad enough, I apparently wrong
them by allowing their creation. But sometimes, popular religious views
imply that the created individual is guaranteed to have an infinitely good
existence on balance. Since, I argue, I don’t wrong someone by allowing their
creation when it’s infinitely good for them on balance, these views apparently have unacceptable implications for procreation ethics. After surveying
various responses, I tentatively suggest that the best solution may involve
adopting an unusual metaphysics of procreation.

1. Introduction
In some religions, certain groups are such that (i) members of these groups
are guaranteed eternal postmortem bliss, and (ii) sometimes, we might
know before an individual is created that if they’re created, they’ll be a
member of that group. Human universalism, the view that all humans live
forever in Heaven, implies this. All humans experience eternal postmortem bliss, and we know in advance whether someone will be human.
So does animal universalism, the view that all non-human animals (or
all sentient animals, etc.) live forever in Heaven.1 Mormons2 and many
Protestants3 endorse an “age of accountability” where moral responsibility begins. Children who die before this go to Heaven. Call this baby
universalism. If we know someone will die young, we know they’ll go
to Heaven. Catholicism teaches that baptized infants who die as infants
are guaranteed Heaven.4 Call this baptized baby universalism. This is like
baby universalism, if we know the child will be baptized. Some Muslims
accept baby universalism, while others hold that (only) the children of
1

For defenses of human universalism, see Talbott 1999 and Reitan and Kronen 2011. For
defenses of animal universalism, see Graves, Hereth, and John 2017 and Crummett 2019.
2
Smith, Teachings of the Presidents of the Church: Joseph Smith 176–178.
3
E.g., Mohler and Akin, “The Salvation of the ‘Little Ones’: Do Infants who Die Go to Heaven?”
4
Catechism, sec. 1261.
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Muslims are guaranteed Heaven.5 The motivations for thinking babies go
to Heaven also apply to humans who never develop the capacities needed
for moral responsibility, so there are analogous views about them.
Views like this are common; perhaps most Abrahamic theists hold
at least one. Say a view is among the Common Views if it (a) asserts that
those in a certain group whose membership is sometimes identifiable in
advance are guaranteed to have infinitely6 good existences on balance7 due
to their being guaranteed Heaven, and (b) isn’t gerrymandered in a sense
which I specify in section four. For each Common View, call the group the
Relevant Group. For human universalism, the Relevant Group is humans;
for baptized baby universalism, it’s baptized humans who die young; etc.
I aim to show a conflict between the Common Views and some compelling judgments about procreative ethics. Here’s the general form: sometimes we know that, if an individual is created, they’ll have a miserable
earthly life. Sometimes, we can’t improve their earthly life if they’re created, but we can prevent their creation altogether. (As discussed below,
this might be true of some factory-farmed animals.) We often wrong these
individuals if we allow their creation and subsequent miserable life. (E.g.,
if we don’t take available steps to reduce demand for factory-farmed products, thereby increasing the size of future generations of factory-farmed
animals, we wrong the animals who are subsequently created.) However,
we apparently don’t wrong an individual by allowing their creation if we
know existing will be infinitely good for them on balance, and we can’t
give them an even better life. And if one of the Common Views is true,
it seems that there could be situations like this but where we know that
the individual in question will be in the Relevant Group, so that coming
into existence will be infinitely good for them on balance, if we allow it to
happen. So, the Common Views apparently have the false implication that
we don’t wrong these individuals by allowing their creation, provided we
know they’ll be members of the Relevant Group. For instance, animal universalism apparently implies that we’re doing factory-farmed animals an
immense favor by allowing their creation, since they’ll experience eternal
postmortem bliss.8

5

Al-Munajjid, “Will Children Who Die Young Go to Paradise or Hell?”
It’s fine if, to avoid technical worries about infinity, we substitute “arbitrarily” or
“indefinitely.”
7
I assume being created can benefit you if your life’s good. This is popular, though controversial (e.g., Heyd, “The Intractability of the Non-Identity Problem”). Religious people
who think we should be grateful to God for creating us will likely agree. Further, the claim
that being created cannot benefit you is a premise in a famous argument for anti-natalism
(Benatar, Better to Have Never Been, ch. 2). And most religious people oppose anti-natalism
(but see Benatar, Better to Have Never Been, 221–223).
8
What to do if we’re unsure whether a Common View itself is true raises difficult Pascalian
questions about responding to uncertain prospects of infinite values. Defending my views
about this would take another paper. One quick fix is framing the puzzle I raise specifically
in terms of the objective rightness and wrongness of our actions.
6
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The problem can be expressed by noting that the following three propositions form an inconsistent triad, where (1) and (2) have independent
motivations and where (3) is implied by any Common View:
1. If existence will be infinitely good for an individual on balance, and we
can’t affect their condition if they are created, we don’t wrong them by
allowing their creation.
2. For any Relevant Group, there are possible cases where we’d wrong individuals by allowing their creation, even though we know that, if the individual is created, they’ll be a member of that Relevant Group, and we
can’t affect their condition if they are created.
3. For some Relevant Group, even members in cases like those mentioned
in (2) really are such that existence would be infinitely good for them on
balance.

Since rejecting (1) or (2) is (I argue) unattractive, and since any Common
View implies (3), the inconsistency provides reason to reject all Common
Views. This may have further implications. E.g., some Common Views
might be very likely on theism. Maybe a good God would let everyone, or
at least infants or non-human animals, into Heaven. In that case, reasons
to reject the relevant forms of universalism are reasons to reject theism.
However, I won’t defend any judgment about what the best response overall is for an adherent of one of the Common Views, and I’ll ultimately suggest a possible way out. (In fact, I’m a theist and both a human and animal
universalist, so naturally I hope for some solution.)
In section two, I explain the puzzle faced by one particular Common
View: animal universalism. I single it out because its connection to factory
farming gives it particular real-world relevance. In section three, I argue
that ethical responses, which reject (1), are unpromising. In section four,
I show how the problem can be generalized to Common Views besides
animal universalism. In section five, I discuss how my argument differs
from some superficially similar arguments. In section six, I discuss metaphysical responses. These reject (2), but for an odd reason. They don’t dispute what we should do in those cases. They instead deny that taking the
intuitively right action really prevents a being from coming into existence.
E.g., maybe God’s already made the souls of all the created beings who
will ever exist, and procreation merely allows a soul to incarnate. Some
metaphysical responses solve the problem only by committing to other
implausible ethical claims. However, I tentatively defend the one I think
works best.
2. The Puzzle
I’ll start with animal universalism. Consider9 that many farmed animals
can’t be helped through my consumption choices. The animal whose meat
I purchase is already dead. Animals currently being farmed for meat won’t
9

Cf. Podgorski, “The Diner’s Defence.”
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be spared slaughter, or given better conditions, because demand dips. If
I affect anything, I affect the size of future generations of farmed animals.
Fewer sales might mean fewer animals raised in the future.
If these future animals would have worthwhile lives, this raises a puzzle: if eating farmed animals doesn’t affect currently existing animals,
and creates on balance happy animals, does that justify eating meat (cf.
Podgorski forthcoming)? It’s controversial; some answers will be relevant
in section 3.1. But note that most farmed animals have unhappy lives.
They’re factory-farmed; their lives are bad, or at least not good enough, on
balance. Basically everyone who accords animals moral status recognizes
a pro tanto duty to not create them under conditions like this.10 That wrongs
them; they have a complaint against us once they exist. This may not be
the only reason why creating factory-farmed animals is wrong. Perhaps it
harms currently existing animals by increasing how often they’re forcibly
impregnated. Perhaps it harms the environment. Etc. But the effect on the
animals created is part of the problem. It’s not as though creating factory-farmed animals would be okay if they were gestated from synthetic
gametes in environmentally friendly artificial wombs.
Now consider:
Prevention: I can reduce demand for factory-farmed products by organizing
an effective boycott, or passing a tax on these products, or ordering Catholics
to avoid them (I’m the Pope). Further, I’m in the position described above:
I can’t help these animals if they’re created, but I can prevent their creation.

The question now isn’t about creating factory-farmed animals. It’s about
preventing their creation. Still, I should act. Allowing their creation wrongs
them: their bad lives give them a complaint against me.
But animal universalism threatens this judgment. If animal universalism is true, life is infinitely good for factory-farmed animals, however
miserable their earthly lives. Their finite suffering is followed by eternal
bliss. And often, I don’t wrong an individual by allowing them to come
into a life with some suffering, if I know their existence will even just be
extremely good for them on balance.11 Consider:
Roommate: My roommate is about to conceive a child. The child will suffer
significantly due to wrongdoing by others, but their life will be extremely
good overall. I can’t help the child once they exist. However, I can prevent
their conception by knocking on the bedroom door at the right time.

Perhaps it depends on the details, but I think I generally don’t wrong the
child by failing to knock. This has something to do with the fact that, while
10
Bob Fischer (The Ethics of Eating Animals: Usually Bad, Sometimes Wrong, Often Permissible)
accords animals moral status, but has recently argued that eating factory-farmed animals
products is usually permissible. But he recognizes this duty (ch. 2); he just denies that you
affect how many animals are created (ch. 4).
11
Cf. Podgorski, “The Diner’s Defence,” sec. 4.
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I allow them to experience harm, my inaction allows them to experience
much more flourishing, and I can’t get the one without the other. But similar reasoning suggests that my inaction in Prevention doesn’t wrong the
animals if animal universalism is true. Really, my justification in Prevention
seems stronger since they’ll experience infinitely more flourishing.
This is compatible with the farmers wronging the animals by keeping
them in miserable conditions. I’m not saying eternal bliss excuses gratuitous harm. The factory farmers could treat the animals better after they
exist, giving them eternal bliss without terrible suffering. But I can’t. I must
choose between the animals experiencing suffering followed by eternal
bliss and their experiencing nothing whatsoever. If the animals demanded
that I justify allowing their creation, knowing they’d suffer on Earth,
I could truthfully respond that allowing this was overwhelmingly better
for them than the alternative. The factory farmer cannot say this when
asked to justify keeping the animals in miserable conditions.
Neither does this commit us to saying that we have an obligation to
create happy beings. Suppose we have obligations to individuals who
exist, but no obligations to non-existent beings, and so no obligation to
create happy lives. That’s fine. The claim is that I should prevent the creation of factory-farmed animals, since, if I don’t, there will exist beings
who I wrong. But on animal universalism, I apparently won’t wrong those
beings by allowing their creation, and that seems incorrect. That’s compatible with the claim that, given animal universalism, I may prevent their
creation, and more generally that I’m not obligated to create beings, or
allow their creation, even when I know they’ll experience eternal bliss.
Finally, this doesn’t commit us to consequentialism. Suppose we’re
contractualists and think we must justify our actions to hypothetical
trustees with the animals’ best interests at heart. We could presumably
justify allowing their creation by reference to the enormous benefits they
get. Suppose we’re Kantians of an animal friendly sort and think we must
treat animals as ends in themselves. Plausibly, we treat them as ends by
allowing them to have an infinitely good life rather than none whatsoever
(cf. sections 3.1 and 3.2). Suppose we’re virtue ethicists or natural law theorists. If we allow the animals’ creation, intending their heavenly bliss and
viewing their earthly suffering as a foreseen but unintended consequence,
it’s not clear why this would be vicious or contrary to natural law (cf. sections 3.4 and 4).12 This might be too quick: next, I discuss arguments for the
claim that we wrong these individuals even if animal universalism is true.
The point is just to note how minimal the ethical assumptions needed to
set up the puzzle are.

12
Some arguments for thinking otherwise depend on the assumption that creating you
cannot benefit you. For instance, Rivka Weinberg’s (The Risk of a Lifetime) contractualist
account of procreation won’t allow the justification I suggest, but it depends on the claim that
creating you cannot benefit you. And I’m operating on the assumption that this claim is false.
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3. Ethical Responses
You might reject (1), the claim that we don’t wrong an individual by allowing their creation when existence will be infinitely good for them on balance and we can’t affect their condition if they’re created. I call instances
of this strategy ethical responses. I think they fail.
3.1 Humane Meat
As mentioned, someone could endorse consuming humanely-raised
meat on the grounds that, even if it’s wrong for the farmers to kill the
animals, all I affect is whether additional, mostly happy animals are created. But others reject this reasoning. Ethical respondents might draw on
their arguments to explain why I should act in Prevention. I don’t object
to these arguments in their original contexts. But I don’t think they address
my puzzle. First, notice that they’re about consuming such products, not
allowing their production. E.g., responding to the claim that buying factory-farmed products is okay because one person can’t change how much
factory-farming happens, Korsgaard13 writes:
The question is. . .about how you are related to that particular creature when
you eat her, or use products that have been extracted from her in ways that
are incompatible with her good. You are treating her as a mere means to
your own ends, and that is wrong.

Korsgaard subsequently14 writes that killing animals for food after raising
them humanely is “not consistent with the good of the animals,” so this
argument also condemns buying humanely-raised meat. Other arguments
claim that, by doing so, you’re complicit in the farmers’ wrongdoing, benefiting from the farmers’ wrongdoing, exploiting the farmed animals, etc.15
But Prevention was about reducing demand for animal products among
other people, not about consuming them myself. In failing to act, I’m not
using animals for my purposes, benefiting from wrongdoing, etc. I’m just
allowing their creation, knowing their suffering is the price of their eternal
bliss. So, these arguments don’t initially seem to apply.
We could expand these arguments and say I have, e.g., a duty to prevent animals being used as mere means when I can. Fair enough. But this
can’t be an exceptionless duty. It must be a pro tanto or imperfect duty, on
pain of (among other things) creating genuine moral dilemmas.16 So the
question is whether I have sufficient reason for allowing the wrongdoing
in this case. I think that, mutatis mutandis, the argument I give in section
3.2.3 shows I do, given animal universalism.
13

Fellow Creatures, 223,
Fellow Creatures, 225.
15
Cf. Podgorski, “The Diner’s Defence,” sec. 7.
16
I.e., sometimes I must choose which of two acts of use as a mere means I must prevent.
If there’s an exceptionless duty to prevent such acts, and I can’t prevent both, I act wrongly
no matter what.
14
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3.2 Non-Identity and Creation Ethics
Responses to the non-identity problem are another obvious resource. If
I dump some waste, leakage in three hundred years will cause serious
birth defects. This will hinder the welfare of those born, but their lives
will still be worth living. Further, my dumping will cause completely different people to exist in three hundred years. Unrelatedly, I’m wondering
whether to conceive a child even though I can’t provide for one. They’ll
face hardships, but they’ll have a life (barely) worth living. Many people
think I act wrongly if I dump the waste or have the child. But who do
I wrong? The relevant people wouldn’t exist otherwise, and their lives
are worth living.17 Clearly, there’s a parallel with Prevention, where failure
to act apparently wrongs individuals who, if I did act, would (given animal universalism) be denied infinitely good lives. The ethical respondent
might hope that understanding why my actions in ordinary non-identity
cases are wrong will show why factory-farming is wrong even given animal universalism, and in turn show why inaction in Prevention is wrong
even given animal universalism. Alternatively, if it turns out that my
actions in ordinary non-identity cases aren’t wrong, perhaps saying inaction is permissible in Prevention is okay.
3.2.1 Biting the Bullet
As the above suggests, there are three main options in ordinary non-identity cases: (A) say I don’t act wrongly after all, (B) say I’ve committed
an impersonal wrong, acting wrongly without wronging anyone, and
(C) say I wrong those I create, even though they wouldn’t have come
into existence otherwise and their lives are worth living (Roberts 2019).
The analogue of (A) says inaction is permissible in Prevention. That’s
unpromising. First, I certainly seem obligated to act in Prevention. Second,
it seems unlikely that anyone who cares enough about animals to accept
animal universalism will dispute this judgment about Prevention. Third,
no one seems likely to dispute that I’m obligated to act in the analogues of
Prevention discussed in the next section (which involve human beings), so
anyone who holds any Common Views about human beings will need to
say something else in those cases, anyway.
3.2.2 Impersonal Wronging
The analogue of (B) says inaction in Prevention is wrong, but doesn’t
wrong anyone. There are two problems. First, I think I really do wrong
the particular animals who wind up getting factory-farmed. Second, it isn’t
clear exactly what this impersonal wrong would be. If I don’t dump the
waste, perhaps different, happier people will be born, increasing aggregate utility. But unless the animals in Prevention will be replaced by other
animals—and we can stipulate otherwise—my preventing their births
17

Cf. Roberts, “The Non-Identity Problem.”
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subtracts net infinite utility from the world, given animal universalism.
We might appeal to values besides just utility, such as fairness or desert.18
I think such appeals can be handled, mutatis mutandis, by the argument
I present in section 3.2.3.
3.2.3 Personal Wronging
The analogue of (C) says inaction in Prevention wrongs the animals who
are created, even though inaction is necessary for their existence, and
existence is infinitely good for them overall. There are many proposed
explanations for why (C) might hold in ordinary non-identity cases:19 e.g.,
maybe the individuals have a birthright to “be born into good enough
circumstances,”20 or are harmed in some non-comparative sense without a
sufficiently good reason,21 or are wrongfully exploited by their ancestors.22
I can’t address all these in depth, and I have no issue with them as explanations of the cases they’re intended to explain. I instead want to present a
direct argument for the claim that I’m not obligated to prevent an individual’s creation specifically in cases like those at issue here, i.e., where the rights
violations committed by others are on a par with those involved in factory
farming, and infinite utility is at stake. There is a large literature on some
of the issues involved in the argument, and I can’t discuss it all.23 I hope
to convey why I find this line of argument persuasive, even though I can’t
foreclose all possible objections here.
Here’s the argument. (As mentioned, it also works against the objections in sections 3.1 and 3.2.2, perhaps with some trivial alterations.)
I have two options. I can refrain from reproducing (call this S0), or I can
have a child with a happy life, free of any suffering until they die at 90
(S1). I think I’m at least permitted to choose S1 over S0. Further, it’s not
just that I’m permitted to choose it for my own sake, because of my strong
interest in procreation; I can choose it apart from such an interest. Now
there’s a new option (S2). At no cost to myself, I can subject my child to a
certain medical procedure. My child will experience a day of intense suffering, having their pro tanto birthright against the infliction of suffering
infringed, but they’ll receive 100,000 more years of happy, suffering-free
life. (The bad day has no lasting ill-effects.) I think I should choose S2
over S1. (It’s often good, and even obligatory, when parents subject their
children to procedures which produce greater costs for lesser benefits.)
Since I could choose S1 over S0, and since I should choose S2 over S1, it

18

Roberts, “The Non-Identity Problem,” sec. 3.2.
Roberts, “The Non-Identity Problem,” sec. 3.3.
20
Velleman, “Persons in Prospect,” 275.
21
Harman, “Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?”
22
Liberto, “The Exploitation Solution to the Non-Identity Problem.”
23
Cf., e.g., Quinn, “The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer”, Norcross, “Contractualism and
Aggregation,” Temkin, Rethinking the Good, and Andreou, “Dynamic Choice.”
19
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also seems right that I could choose S2 over S0. (It’s fine if both S0 and S2
are permissible: perhaps there’s no duty to create happy lives. But if I have
a kid, I should do the procedure.) S2 seems permissible both when my
choice is between S0, S1, and S2, and when S1 is removed, so that I must
choose between just S0 and S2. (Maybe my partner won’t procreate unless
we do the procedure.)
Now I’m offered S3, with a different procedure that causes two days
of intense suffering (with no lasting damage) in exchange for 1,000,000
more years of happy life. If one day of suffering was outweighed by
100,000 years of happy life, presumably a second day will be outweighed
by 900,000 more years. So, I should pick S3 over S2. I’m then offered S4,
which involves three days of suffering but grants 10,000,000 years of extra
happy life, and so on, all the way up to S41, which causes forty days of suffering but grants 10^44 years of happy life.24 I think I should keep trading
up, selecting S41 rather than S1, S2,. . .or S40. And again, given that I could
choose S1 over S0, I think I could choose S41 over S0, either when forced
to pick between just those two or when allowed to choose any options in
the sequence. Note that the average broiler chicken lives forty days before
being slaughtered.25 So S41 introduces into my child’s life about as much
suffering as is experienced by a factory-farmed broiler chicken.
Here are two potential objections to all that. First, perhaps I should stop
trading up before reaching S41. Perhaps there’s some threshold on how
much suffering I can cause my child, whatever the benefits, and this is
reached before S41. I see two problems. First, the idea of such a threshold
seems problematic. I’ve traded, say, three days of suffering for ten million
years of flourishing; why shouldn’t I trade an additional one for ninety million more years of flourishing (or some arbitrarily bigger amount)? Even
if intervals of happiness experience diminishing marginal value, does
their value really hit, or asymptotically approach, zero, so that no additional amount can outweigh a day of suffering (and if they do, isn’t eternal bliss overhyped)? Suppose we decreased the intervals to seconds and
increased the rewards; isn’t it true of every second in the sequence that
I should add it to the earlier seconds in the sequence in exchange for an
additional unfathomable period of flourishing?26 (Saying the threshold is
vague or indeterminate doesn’t help. The problem isn’t that we can’t identify the precise second where I should stop. It’s that, for every second, it’s
24
Puzzles manifest if the sequence continues indefinitely (Pollack, “How Do You
Maximize Expectation Value?”). But it doesn’t.
25
Huemer, Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism, 52.
26
To clarify: I’m not saying that, since you should trade each interval for the correlate
interval of flourishing in isolation, you should trade all the suffering for all the flourishing.
That’s invalid, absent the additional assumption (which I don’t make) that the values of the
intervals of suffering and flourishing depend only on their intrinsic features. Otherwise, e.g.,
an additional second, added to the earlier seconds of suffering, might have increasing marginal
disvalue, or negatively affect one’s whole life in some non-additive way. But effects like this
are already built into whether you should add the second to the earlier seconds, in exchange
for adding the flourishing to the already-obtained periods of flourishing.
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determinately true that I should keep going.) But second, even if there is
a threshold, S41 is likely below it anyway. Consider the length of an ordinary, pretty good human life (~80 years), and the many sources of human
suffering (illness, bereavement, etc.). It wouldn’t be surprising if ordinary,
pretty good human lives contain the equivalent of much more than forty
days of intense suffering.27 But most people think creating ordinary, pretty
good lives is okay. If they’re below the threshold, so too, presumably, is
S41.28
Second, we might deny transitivity. Perhaps I should choose S2 over
S1, S3 over S2. . ., and S41 over S40, but shouldn’t choose S41 over S1.
Or perhaps I should choose S41 over S1, and may choose S1 over S0, but
shouldn’t choose S41 over S0. But this leads to well-known problems (cf.
Norcross 2002). Suppose, e.g., that between just S1 and S0 (choice X),
I may choose either, that between S1 and S41 (Y), I should choose S41,
and that between S41 and S0 (Z), I should choose S0. What should I do in
a choice between all three? Are all options permissible? Well, if I should
choose S41 over S1 in Y, how could adding the option of doing nothing
justify choosing S1? (Imagine: I’m having a child, and am convinced that,
given this, I must give them the procedure. Then I remember I can avoid
having the child, so I have the child but don’t give them the procedure.)
Are all options impermissible? Genuine moral dilemmas seem problematic generally, but especially here: if I could choose S41 over S1 in Y, how
does adding the option of doing nothing make it that I act wrongly no
matter what? Is S0 obligatory? If I could choose S1 in X, how does adding
a different, better option obligate me to choose S0? Is S1 obligatory? If
I should choose S41 over S1 in Y, how does adding the option of doing
nothing obligate me to choose S1? Is S41 obligatory? If I should choose
S0 in Z, how does adding S1 obligate me to choose S41? Are only S0 and
S1 permissible? If I should choose S41 over S1 in Y, how does adding the
option of doing nothing justify choosing S1? Are only S0 and S41 permissible? If I should choose S0 in Z, how does adding S1 justify choosing
S41? Are only S1 and S41 permissible? If I should choose S41 over S1 in
Y, how does adding the option of doing nothing justify choosing S1? But
that’s every possibility. So, intransitivity leads to problems, and the same
argument can be run, mutatis mutandis, for other relevant claims about
intransitivity (e.g., that I should choose S2 over S1, S3 over S2, etc., but
shouldn’t choose S41 over S1).
27

Cf. Huemer, Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism, 52.
Some philosophers (e.g., Velleman, “Well-Being and Time”) think the temporal distribution of well-being in a life—the “shape” of a life—affects its goodness. E.g., one that starts
off well and ends poorly might be worse than one which starts off poorly and ends well.
Maybe it matters that the chicken’s suffering is largely unbroken, while human suffering is
usually spread out. But I think many worthwhile human lives contain more than forty days
of largely unbroken intense suffering (e.g., several months of bereavement, severe illness,
combat service, etc.) so that much largely unbroken suffering doesn’t exceed the threshold,
either.
28
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So: in a choice between (just) S0 and S41, I (at least) may choose S41.
This isn’t quite analogous to Prevention yet. Let’s rectify that. Suppose the
suffering’s caused by impurities in the life-extension serum. Further, these
impurities kill the child after 10^44 years: otherwise, they’d live even
longer. The doctor could purify the serum but doesn’t because they want
to gain some information about allergens which they’ll sell to a cosmetics company. The doctor acts wrongly in administering the impure serum
rather than a pure one. But my choice is between the impure serum and
no child at all. Surely, I can choose the former. Now suppose we’re not
talking about my child. Someone else faces the choice I had and is giving
their kid the impure serum; I can stop them by preventing their procreating altogether. Since I could bring about S41 in my own case, surely
I can allow someone else to make the analogous choice in their case. Now
we’re closer to the situation with animal universalism and Prevention (as
it relates to broiler chickens, anyway): I’m choosing whether to allow an
individual’s creation, knowing they’ll suffer intensely for forty days and
be unjustly killed through wrongful exploitation by another, but also that
they’ll experience an unfathomable amount of flourishing.
There are three more disanalogies. First, if animal universalism is true,
animals get infinite utility, not just 10^44 years worth. That works in my
favor. Second, Prevention is about animals, not humans. Some people (e.g.,
those sympathetic to “utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people”)
might think that also works in my favor, but I won’t appeal to that. Third,
the parent here is willingly procreating, whereas factory-farmed animals
are bred in ways inconsistent with their good. The farmer commits a further wrong which the doctor doesn’t. But this won’t be a difference-maker:
as mentioned, surely I should act even if the farmed animals are gestated
from synthetic gametes in artificial wombs, and my having an interest in
procreation was unnecessary for S1’s permissibility.
So, again: I’m not rejecting option (C) in the standard cases, but I have a
direct argument that the analogue doesn’t work here. This argument also
applies to the strategies discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2.2. E.g., suppose
I shouldn’t dump the waste because doing so is unfair to future people,
and unfairness makes the world impersonally worse. The above reasoning supports the claim that, even if this is right ordinarily, any unfairness
involved in failing to act in Prevention doesn’t obligate me to act (since it
supports the claim that I’m not obligated to act in Prevention). Perhaps the
ethical respondent should look elsewhere, then: to the effects of inaction
on others, or on our relationship to God. I consider such moves next.
3.3 Indirect Effects
Maybe we should act in Prevention because of how factory farming affects
the people involved. Perhaps it brutalizes them. Perhaps it makes them go
to Hell. I see two problems. First, it doesn’t easily account for the fact that
the animals who are factory farmed, rather than the farmers and consumers,
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are wronged by inaction. Second, we’d be obligated to act in Prevention
absent these effects. Suppose factory farming was carried out by non-sentient robots, with no moral agents involved in production or consumption;
we’d still be obligated to interfere with this. More realistically: suppose
our option in Prevention is to impose a tax which slightly reduces demand.
The same people raise and consume animals as would without the tax;
they raise and consume slightly fewer than they otherwise would, but
would happily raise or consume more if not for economic considerations.
It’s unclear why this would be any less brutalizing than their behavior
without the tax, but I should impose it.29
3.4 Presumption
Here’s another possibility. Mark Murphy30 thinks allowing abortion
because it will guarantee the aborted fetuses eternal bliss (see sec. 5) would
be “presumptuous with respect to God’s willingness to bestow abundant
blessings upon us,”31 because it relies on God to make up for our permitting wrongdoing. He provides32 this case:
I am a teacher. . .Bully. . .has an unfortunate tendency to beat up Victim. . .I
know. . .that Victim’s uncle. . .takes pity on Victim and deposits $1000 into
Victim’s trust fund whenever Victim takes a beating. . .Victim may well
accumulate quite a nest egg, long after the beatings by the neighborhood
thug are forgotten. . .does the harm that Victim suffers at the hands of Bully
provide me with reason to prohibit Bully from beating Victim?

Murphy thinks allowing the beatings is “deeply presumptuous, relying
on the Victim’s uncle to compensate for the harm suffered by Victim, harm
that it was in my power to prevent or at least to ameliorate.”33 Maybe inaction in Prevention is similarly presumptuous.
Obviously, the harm’s a reason to act in Prevention. The question is
whether it’s strong enough to require action. I have two worries. First,
again, it’s unclear how this explains why we wrong the animals; the presumptuousness is directed towards God, not them. Second, I doubt our
judgment about the teacher carries over. Realistically, our sense that the
29
Jeff Sebo and Tyler John (“Consequentialism and Non-Human Animals”) give an indirect utilitarian argument against humane farming. First, participation in humane farming
allegedly promotes speciesism and lack of concern for animals. Someone might argue analogously in Prevention. This would be analogous to the move in the main text and run into the
problems expressed there. (I think it’s clearer that the animals created are themselves harmed
when they have terrible earthly lives than when they have on-balance good ones. So, these
objections have more force against this analogue of Sebo and John’s proposal than against
their proposal in context.) Second, Sebo and John argue that, in practice, even supposedly
conscientious omnivores aren’t likely to stick to eating only humanely-raised meat, and even
supposedly conscientiously-omnivorous societies aren’t likely to stick to only producing it.
There’s no analogue to this slippery slope in Prevention. They’re already being factory-farmed.
30
“Pro-Choice and Presumption.”
31
“Pro-Choice,” 242.
32
“Pro-Choice,” 241.
33
“Pro-Choice,” 242.
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teacher should intervene is influenced by the fact that we can’t really be
sure that the uncle will pay or the money will make up for the beatings,
the fact that we’re imposing a burden on the uncle, the fact that teachers
have role-given obligations which make some aspects of their students’
lives more salient than others, etc. Suppose the uncle would respond to
the beatings by providing his nephew with an immortality serum, that the
serum would only work on the nephew anyway so that this imposed no
cost on anyone else, and that we were somehow absolutely sure the beatings (and nothing else) would get him the serum. Now it seems permissible—maybe obligatory!—to let the beatings happen, just like it would be
permissible to subject a child to painful medical procedures to give them
immortality. But this is more analogous, since God offers an infinite benefit, presumably at no cost to himself, and there’s no risk of his failing to
follow through.
Someone might claim that, given the huge benefit to the nephew and
the non-existent cost to the uncle, the uncle is obligated to hand over the
serum whether or not the beating happens, and this affects whether we’re
presumptuous. Maybe this is different from heavenly life, which is God’s
gracious gift. (Set aside the question why God isn’t obligated to give animals eternal life.) But return to Roommate. It may often be that individuals
have lives worth living only because others perform supererogatory acts
for them. Maybe my roommate’s child wouldn’t overcome their suffering if not for gracious, supererogatory acts by others (which I know these
people will perform). This doesn’t itself make it wrong to refrain from
knocking on the door, much less make it that I wrong the child (rather than
these people) through inaction.
3.5 Divine Command
Finally: maybe God commands us to act in cases like Prevention, and divine
commands generate (or constitute, are, etc.) moral obligations. I doubt this
suggestion helps. Contemporary divine command theorists34 generally
think God has prior reasons for issuing commands, even though the command is necessary for the obligation’s existence. Further, these reasons
should have something to do with the animals themselves (rather than,
say, the farmers’ characters) to account for the intuition that we wrong
the animals. But what are these reasons? Presumably, they’d be ones like
those discussed in sections 3.1–3.4. But I argued that, on the assumption
that divine command theory is false, these reasons don’t give us obligations to the animals to act in Prevention. I think the same arguments probably show that, on the assumption that divine command theory is true,
God lacks adequate reason to issue the relevant kind of command.
Leaving ethical responses behind, one could instead reject (2), the claim
that there are cases where we wrong individuals by allowing their creation,

34

E.g., Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods.
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even though we know they’ll be in the Relevant Group. The obvious way
to reject (2) is to say I’m not obligated to act in Prevention, or its analogues
in section four. I explained why I rejected this in section 3.2.1. But there’s
another way to oppose (2), which I discuss in section six. Next, I show
how the puzzle generalizes to other Common Views.
4. Generalizing
Of course, some people accept a Common View, but reject animal universalism. Some lost souls even endorse factory farming, and so deny
that I must act in Prevention. But my puzzle generalizes to other Common
Views. Consider:
Human Prevention: This is like Prevention, except human beings are farmed.
If human universalism is true, this is analogous to Prevention.

Now consider:
Baby Prevention: This is like Human Prevention. Also, the farmed
individuals are slaughtered in infancy.

If baby universalism is true, this is also analogous. Consider:
Baptized Baby Prevention: This is like Baby Prevention. Also, the infants
are baptized before they are slaughtered.

If baptized baby universalism is true, this is also analogous. Etc. We can
also imagine more realistic cases. I know that, if my roommate conceives
a child, the child will have a genetic condition which guarantees them a
short earthly life full of suffering. Intuitively, I ought to knock on the door
and prevent the conception, and the child who’s born has a complaint
against me if I don’t. Yet these views imply that (at least if the child is baptized, etc.) existence would be infinitely good for them on balance. These
cases show that neither rejecting animal universalism, nor rejecting my
judgment about Prevention, themselves resolve the problem. Many people
who reject animal universalism accept one of these other views, and even
those who endorse factory farming oppose baby factory farming.
Employing an ethical response in defense of these other Common
Views doesn’t seem easier than employing one in defense of animal universalism. My earlier criticisms didn’t rely on the relevant individuals
being non-human animals; indeed, some relied on analogies with cases
involving humans. Someone might claim that, if baby universalism or
baptized baby universalism, but not animal or human universalism, are
true, then inaction in Baby Prevention or Baptized Baby Prevention violates
the principle of double effect, whereas the same isn’t true of Prevention or
Human Prevention. For animal and human universalism, whether you’re
in the Relevant Group depends just on the kind of thing you are. But for
baby and baptized baby universalism, whether you’re in the Relevant
Group also depends on when you die. If the babies in Baby Prevention and
Baptized Baby Prevention are guaranteed Heaven because they die young,
their deaths might be means to the resulting good. And double effect
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condemns doing evil to realize good, however great the good. But double
effect prohibits doing evil, not allowing evil. E.g., double effect is commonly taken to condemn euthanizing patients, but not allowing patients
to die by withdrawing medical treatment in order to end their suffering.
Double effect condemns the farmers killing the babies, since the good they
cause is achieved through evil means. But it doesn’t apply to my inaction.
So, we can extend the puzzle to different Common Views: for each
view, plug its Relevant Group into an analogue of Prevention. Who avoids
the puzzle? I’m defining Common Views as those which (a) assert that
those in a certain group whose membership is sometimes identifiable in
advance are guaranteed to have infinitely good existences on balance due
to their being guaranteed Heaven, and (b) aren’t gerrymandered in a sense
which I specify in the next paragraph. So, one avoids Common Views by
avoiding either (a) or (b). One avoids (a) by believing that the afterlife
is non-existent, bad, neutral, or only finitely good. One also avoids it by
holding that it’s always unpredictable in advance whether an individual goes to Heaven: e.g., maybe salvation requires making the right free
choices, and these are unpredictable in principle. (Perhaps those who die
in infancy are reincarnated until they get a chance to make such choices,
or make them post-mortem.)
One could also avoid (b) by holding what I’m calling a gerrymandered
view. Such a view claims that, although it may sometimes be possible to
know in advance that, if an individual is created, they’ll go to Heaven, this
is never true of individuals whose creation it otherwise intuitively seems
like we ought to prevent. That prevents us from constructing an analogue
of Prevention. E.g., maybe only people with pleasant earthly lives go to
Heaven. Here, if we know you’ll have a pleasant earthly life, we know
you’ll go to Heaven. But this still avoids the puzzle, since any individual
whose earthly existence prospectively seems bad enough to require our
preventing it is excluded from the Relevant Group.
But gerrymandering is independently unattractive. If a gerrymandered
view is true, presumably individuals whose existence intuitively ought to
be prevented are excluded from the Relevant Group due to some explanatory connection between their earthly condition and their post-mortem
fate. Maybe God decides in advance that he dislikes some individuals,
inflicting both bad earthly lives and exclusion from Heaven on them. Or
maybe God dislikes losers and punishes those with bad earthly lives by
excluding them from Heaven. Both seem implausible for a good God.
Further, it’s unclear that anyone’s ever actually accepted gerrymandering anyway. (Perhaps the closest anyone’s come is the belief among some
Calvinists that worldly success is a sign of predestination to Heaven. But
I doubt even they think the link is as tight as gerrymandering requires.)
So, it’s unclear why anyone would accept gerrymandering, except as an
ad hoc and implausible way of avoiding my argument. That’s why I call it
“gerrymandering” and don’t think it poses a serious threat.
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5. Abortion
Others have also argued that certain views of the afterlife have odd ethical implications. Notable here (because they may seem particularly analogous to my argument) are arguments advanced by Kenneth Himma35
and Stephen Kershnar.36 Both grant fetal personhood, for argument’s sake.
Himma thinks baby universalism, together with the claim that some adults
go to Hell and a Millian harm principle, implies that abortion should be
legal since, rather than doing the fetus harm overall, it guarantees their
entrance to Heaven. Kershnar claims that baby universalism, when combined with the view that some adults go to Hell, entails abortion’s moral
permissibility, since it eliminates the risk of Hell.
Neither Himma nor Kershnar suggest that the pro-choice conclusions
of their arguments are absurd in the way that I suggested that any view
which accepts the permissibility of failing to act in Prevention is absurd.
Himma wants to show how a Christian could be legally pro-choice while
granting fetal personhood. Kershnar wants to show an internal tension in
the views of many pro-life religious people. But Himma’s argument would
probably also show that the murder of infants—or, for that matter, anyone
else who will go to Heaven if they die now, but might not if they live—
should be legal. Kershnar’s argument would show the same about the
morality of killing such people. Those are absurd implications, whatever
one thinks about abortion. (Himma37 thinks infanticide could be prohibited because it would “have the effect of diminishing the respect that we
have for human life in general and hence would be likely to increase rates
of violent crime.”38 My criticisms from section 3.3 apply to this. Kershnar39
just accepts that his argument has this implication.)
But my argument is troubling in ways that their arguments aren’t, for
three reasons. First, both assume that some adults go to Hell. This—or at
least the claim that some adults are excluded from Heaven, perhaps being
annihilated—is why abortion supposedly benefits the fetus: it’s guaranteed entrance to Heaven, but might be excluded otherwise. Otherwise,
someone could claim, e.g., that abortion harms the fetus by denying it
certain goods connected to earthly life, while it would have been guaranteed the heavenly benefits anyway. But some philosophers (including Kershnar)40 think God’s excluding people from Heaven forever is
implausible on independent ethical grounds. Learning that this view has
implausible results when conjoined with other views is unexciting if it
was implausible anyway. But the problem in my puzzle is generated by
God’s including individuals in Heaven. So, my argument applies even to
35

“No Harm, No Foul.”
Does the Pro-Life Worldview Make Sense?
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universalists who escape Himma’s and Kershnar’s arguments.41 If anything, the problem is worse for human and animal universalists, since the
members of the Relevant Groups associated with these views are more
numerous and easier to identify.
Second, my argument focuses, not on killing, but on allowing the creation of someone who will suffer and be killed. Some people think abortion
cannot be justified on consequentialist grounds because abortion intentionally kills the innocent, and this is categorically prohibited.42 Since
Kershnar argues (conditional on the relevant assumptions) for the moral
permissibility of abortion due to expected future consequences, he must
reject this. He instead endorses “threshold deontology,”43 according to
which the side constraint against killing the innocent can be overridden
by sufficiently weighty consequences. But my argument is compatible
with a categorical prohibition against intentionally killing the innocent.
Third, if God exists and some people are damned to Hell (or excluded
from Heaven), presumably there’s some reason why God gives us the ability to damn ourselves to Hell (or exclude, etc.), rather than putting us in
Heaven without our exercising that ability. (If God does the latter with
humans who die young, it must be possible.) The reason might involve
the value of free will, of a virtuous earthly life, etc. If God’s perfectly good,
this reason must be weighty enough to justify the risks. And if free will
or earthly virtue (etc.) give God a reason weighty enough to let us make
choices that might damn us, it might also give us a reason weighty enough
for us to let others make such choices. Perhaps it would also give God a
reason to prohibit infanticide, etc., so we don’t interfere with such goods.
The response from Kershnar44 and, implicitly, Himma45 is that free
will, etc., possess only finite value, whereas Heaven is infinitely valuable
and damnation is infinitely disvaluable. So, there’s inadequate reason to
increase the chance of an individual’s missing Heaven, and suffering Hell,
in pursuit of these finite goods. But this is just one of the independent objections to Hell mentioned above: it implies that God has decisive reason not
to create the relevant afterlife system at all. Then we don’t need the rest of
the argument. The view which Kershnar and Himma discuss is unworkable anyway.
But there’s no analogous objection to my argument. My decision isn’t
between guaranteeing someone Heaven and pursuing the goods of freedom, etc., but between guaranteeing them Heaven (at the expense of
earthly misery) or preventing their existence altogether. Non-existence
doesn’t give them the goods of a good earthly life anyway, so whether
41
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these goods are important enough to risk exclusion from Heaven is
irrelevant.
6. Metaphysical Responses
Here’s a final response to my puzzle. I’ll tentatively defend a version of it.
One could reject (2), not by denying that you should act in Prevention and
its analogues, but by rejecting my characterization of what acting does.
Maybe I wrong the relevant individuals through inaction in these cases,
but action doesn’t prevent their existence. This is a metaphysical response.
An example: suppose substance dualism is true of humans and animals
and God has already made all the creaturely souls which will ever exist.
Here, procreation doesn’t create anybody; it simply makes available a
body in which somebody becomes incarnate. This isn’t totally ad hoc. The
pre-existence of the soul has been defended by Platonist, Neo-Platonist,
and other philosophers,46 by significant Jewish, Christian47 and especially
Islamic traditions,48 and is widely accepted by Mormons.49 Maybe everyone’s eventually embodied, and acting in Prevention causes the individuals to incarnate at different times in different bodies. Call this Different
Earthly Life. Or perhaps acting in Prevention keeps the individuals from
incarnating at all. Maybe they just live in Heaven. Call this No Earthly
Life.50 (There are other possibilities, but these are natural views.)
There are possible metaphysical objections to metaphysical responses.
E.g., if origin essentialism is true and I began existing at conception, then
I couldn’t exist if you prevented that conception. But notice that metaphysical responses may not require that I pre-exist my earthly life. If origin
essentialism is false, perhaps I actually began at conception, but could have
been conceived under different circumstances. Further, even if metaphysical responses require pre-existence, they may not require dualism. Many
philosophers think I’m material but am capable of surviving physical
death, thereby transitioning from earthly life to the afterlife.51 Perhaps theories of how this is possible will also allow me to transition from pre-life
to earthly life, if I’m material.
Metaphysical responses eliminate the tradeoff between earthly suffering and eternal bliss. Since the individual exists no matter what I do,
I may be able to get them the latter without the former, by either (given
Different Earthly Life) causing them to incarnate under different, hopefully
better, circumstances or (given No Earthly Life) sparing them earthly life
altogether. To evaluate metaphysical responses, we need a further distinction about why I should act in these cases. Perhaps it’s because it’s (in
46
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expectation) better overall for the individual. Maybe a life of infinite bliss
in Heaven preceded by earthly misery is worse than a life of such bliss on
its own, or than one preceded by earthly flourishing, even if modeling this
mathematically requires nonstandard elements such as surreal numbers.52
Call this Welfare Difference.
Or maybe our action makes no difference to the overall well-being of
the individual in question, with our obligation to act instead grounded
wholly in some other way. Call this Welfare Equality. Maybe we think, for
mathematical reasons, that finite earthly suffering can’t affect the value
of a life which includes infinite positive heavenly value. Or maybe we
think that, as Marilyn McCord Adams argues,53 God ultimately defeats
all evils by incorporating them into positively-valued organic unities, so
that no one’s life will be worse for them overall because of the evils in it.
Different Earthly Life/No Earthly Life and Welfare Difference/Welfare Equality
represent a cross-cutting distinction: either member of either pair could
be combined with either member of the other. The No Earthly Life/Welfare
Difference combination is what I’m tentatively defending.
Welfare Equality should be rejected in light of its implausible implications. Both the infinitarian and the defeat-based justifications imply that
nothing overall harmful ever happens to anyone, provided they make it
to Heaven (as, according to Common Views, members of Relevant Groups
do). I,54 responding partly to Adams, have argued elsewhere that this
undermines ordinary ethics. Ordinary moral and prudential reasoning,
along with ordinary judgments about which emotional reactions to events
are appropriate, centrally presuppose that all-things-considered harmful
events sometimes befall people. E.g., my decision about whether to subject my child to a painful surgery is affected by whether I think it’s least
harmful to them on balance (even if I also think they’ll make it to Heaven).
Different Earthly Life/Welfare Difference also has implausible implications.
Here, everyone eventually gets an earthly life, and the idea is presumably
that we should prevent unpromising lives in hopes that the relevant individuals will get better ones. But this makes whether we should act in cases
like Prevention depend, not just on the absolute quality of a life, but also
on how it compares to other lives within some class. It thus faces a classic
objection to what Parfit calls “the Average Principle,” which states that
the value of a world depends, not on the aggregate amount of well-being
in it, but rather on the average amount of well-being.55 The objection in
both cases is that the relevant view gives reasons to create bad lives, or not
create good ones, because of how they compare to intuitively irrelevant
lives. Suppose most future lives will be extremely bad because, in two
hundred years, a malevolent AI will seize control and submit everyone
to unceasing torture forever. Different Earthly Life/Welfare Difference then
52
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gives us reason to procreate as much as possible now, even if the lives
in question will be very bad, so as to spare those individuals incarnating
under worse conditions in the future. On the other hand, suppose technological advances will make life for everyone vastly better. This would give
us reason not to create even very happy lives now, since these individuals
will get even better lives in the future. These results are absurd.
However, No Earthly Life/Welfare Difference avoids the problems mentioned above. By allowing for all-things-considered harms, it avoids the
problem with Welfare Equality. It can also avoid the problem with Different
Earthly Life/Welfare Difference. Suppose some earthly lives are worth incarnating for, while others aren’t. It seems plausible that which is which will
depend on the absolute, not the comparative, quality of one’s life. And it
seems plausible to draw the line wherever we ordinarily think the line for
permissible procreation should be drawn.
This view still faces at least two potential ethical objections. (The first
is also faced by all metaphysical responses, and the second is at least also
faced by Different Earthly Life/Welfare Difference.) First, we ordinarily think
we should be grateful to our parents for our existence. But metaphysical
responses imply that we at most owe them for our incarnation, or our
incarnating when we did. But this might be acceptable. The view implies
that we should be grateful to them for the value of our earthly lives. This
is essentially what people who don’t believe in an afterlife think anyway,
though they differ over whether that’s “all we have.” On the other hand,
we usually don’t think we should be infinitely grateful to our parents. But
if they’re responsible for our existence, which includes eternal bliss, perhaps we should be. This view accounts for this by saying that we would
have gotten eternal bliss anyway, and they’re just responsible for the finite
value of our earthly lives.
Second, this view might foreclose an attractive view in procreation
ethics. Many think we’re not obligated to create new individuals with
happy lives because we only have obligations to existing individuals, and
individuals who aren’t created don’t exist. But here, the individual who
would have been born does exist; they’re just denied a valuable earthly
life. Failing to procreate would then be more like failing to benefit an existing person. This seems counterintuitive, but perhaps not unacceptably so.
After all, some people do think we’re pro tanto obligated to procreate when
doing so will produce a happy individual, and some people think we’re
not obligated, but for some other reason.
So: from an ethical perspective, No Earthly Life/Welfare Difference might
be best. It could still be unattractive for other (metaphysical, theological,
etc.) reasons. If so, the puzzle stands. If not, that’s itself significant, since
probably the vast majority of people who hold Common Views don’t hold
this view. The strength of non-ethical objections to it, and of any other
potential responses which I haven’t discussed, are matters for future
research.
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich
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